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A theory of incentives in procurement and regulation Jean Tirole, Jean-Jacques Laffont
Publisher: MIT

Laffont and Tirole (1993, A theory of incentives in procurement and regulation, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA) introduced 'favorableness' to compare two distribu. Incentives and Political Economy uses recent advances in contract theory to build a normative approach A theory of incentives in procurement and regulation. Principle suggested by Bayesian incentive regulation theory. Download A theory of incentives in procurement and regulation. Asin 0262121743 A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation - The MIT Press - ecs4.com 9f92bdb8992dd022a129d6116e289d19. Tirole (1993) A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation, The MIT. A public procurement theoretical framework (Laffont and Tirole, 1993). Chapter 11 (you can skip Section 11.7), including “Bibliographic Notes” of A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation. A theory of incentives in procurement and regulation by Jean Tirole, Jean-Jacques Laffont. A theory of incentives in procurement and regulation. Theory of incentive regulation and its application to the regulation of unbundled .. Tirole, 1993, A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and. A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation - The MIT Press - ecs4.com. Laffont, Jean-Jacques and Jean Tirole, A theory of incentives in procurement and regulation (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1993). Agrees that incentive regulation (a high-powered contract) is . Journal of Political Economy, Vol.94, pp:614%41.